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Chapter 11 
Cordon Pricing Consistent with the Physics of 
Overcrowding 
Nikolas Geroliminis and David M. Levinson, University of Minnesota, U.S.A. 
Abstract This paper describes the modeling of recurring congestion in a network. 
It is shown that the standard economic models of marginal cost cannot describe 
precisely traffic congestion in networks during time-dependent conditions. Fol-
lowing a macroscopic traffic approach, we describe the equilibrium solution for a 
congested network in the no-toll case. A dynamic model of cordon-based conges-
tion pricing (such as for the morning commute) for networks is developed consis-
tent with the physics of traffic. The paper combines Vickrey’s theory with a ma-
croscopic traffic model, which is readily observable with existing monitoring 
technologies. The paper also examines some policy implications of the cordon-
based pricing to treat equity and reliability issues, i.e. in what mobility level a city 
should choose to operate. An application of the model in a downtown area shows 
that these schemes can improve mobility and relieve congestion in cities. 
1. Introduction 
Traffic congestion is a classic externality, increasingly pervasive in urban areas. 
Constructing new infrastructure is an expensive solution to decrease congestion, 
not only because of the tremendous cost to keep pace with population increases 
and the resulting increase in travel demand but also because of the phenomenon of 
induced demand. To alleviate traffic congestion in cities, road pricing has been 
proposed by many researchers as an effective policy. The intention is to alter trav-
elers’ behavior enough to reduce congestion by charging them for the externalities 
they create. This paper aims to lay out a clear model of traffic congestion that can 
be applied to cordon pricing, and allows us to critique the plausibility of several 
economic models of congestion that have appeared in the literature. 
The vast literature of congestion pricing can be composed in two categories, 
marginal-cost pricing models and bottleneck models. The theoretical background 
of marginal-cost pricing has relied on the fundamental concept, first introduced by 
Pigou (1920) and followed by Vickrey (1963), Beckmann (1965) and other re-
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searchers; If on each link of a network a toll is charged, which equals the addition-
al congestion cost imposed on other users by an extra traveler, the sum of con-
sumers’ surplus and total revenue is maximized. In the traffic assignment literature 
tolls of this type (first-best pricing) have been proposed to drive a user equilibrium 
pattern (Wardrop 1952) toward a system optimum. Despite their idealized theoret-
ical basis, first-best pricing models have been impractical and difficult to imple-
ment. Marchand (1968) studied the theory of second-best tolls using a general 
equilibrium model for network with two routes in parallel, for a fixed period. Ac-
cording to the second-best pricing models, e.g. Arnott et al. (1990a) and McDo-
nald (1995), tolls are charged in a subset of selected links, where are the bottle-
necks.  
Instead of charging in individual separate links, cordon- or area-based pricing 
schemes has been developed and applied in different cities including Singapore, 
Trondheim, Oslo, Stockholm, and London. Recently, Maruyama and Sumalee 
(2007) compared performance of cordon- and area-road pricing schemes on their 
efficiency and equity. Congestion pricing in general networks has been discussed 
mainly for the static situation. In network level, Yang and Huang (1998) examined 
the principle of marginal-cost pricing in a road network, Anderson and Mohring 
(1997) examined congestion on the Twin Cities road network having drivers face 
marginal rather than average costs to reflect optimal prices using a user equili-
brium assignment for a single period, while Liu and Boyce (2002) examined the 
condition for dynamic traffic assignment with multiple time periods, and Yang 
and Lam (1996) analyzed the optimal road tolls under conditions of both queuing 
and congestion. The basic ambiguity in most of these models is that traffic condi-
tions are considered stationary or semi-stationary. One of the aspects of our paper 
is to analyze, based on a new methodology, dynamic pricing schemes (such as 
used in Stockholm, and to a lesser extent in Singapore) that allow system manag-
ers to trade off equity vs. reliability. 
For the dynamic case, bottleneck models, in contrast with the marginal-cost 
pricing models, treat the demand and departure time decision endogenously. To 
the best of our knowledge, the original contribution is Vickrey (1969). This model 
deals with the time-dependent equilibrium distribution of arrivals at a single bot-
tleneck, with particular reference to the morning commute. A traveler usually ex-
periences a delay cost of waiting in the queue and a penalty, “schedule delay”, 
which is the difference between the actual time passing the bottleneck and the de-
sired time; accordingly, he may adjust his departure time to avoid highly con-
gested periods. Equilibrium obtains when no individual has an incentive to alter 
his departure time. Vickrey’s model has been extended and analyzed in various 
ways.  Small (1982) considered the endogenous scheduling of work trips. Smith 
(1984) and Daganzo (1985) proved the existence and uniqueness of Nash equili-
brium if all travelers experience the same convex cost function. Newell (1987) 
analyzed the morning commute problem for non-identical travelers, while Arnott 
et al. (1993) extended the model for the case of elastic demand. Arnott et al. 
(1990b) used Vickrey’s model to evaluate toll policies (fine toll vs. coarse toll) for 
a common desired arrival time for all travelers.  
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The study of dynamic congestion pricing for a network has been limited to 
some idealized situations due to the complications of dynamic traffic assignment 
and network structure and the tediousness of an analytical approach. Huang and 
Yang (1996) used control theory to determine the optimal variable tolls on a con-
gested network of parallel routes with elastic demand, while Yang and Meng 
(1998) applied a space-time expanded network approach (initially proposed by 
Ford and Fulkerson (1962)) to estimate optimal toll in a queueing network with 
elastic demand. The missing piece for these analyses is that, as we will explain 
later, the average flow and the output rate of a network, i.e. the capacity of bottle-
necks decreases when there are spillovers from downstream bottlenecks, typically 
found with high values of car density. Lago and Daganzo (2007) analyzed the 
morning commute problem for some simple freeway networks with queue spillov-
ers and merge interactions. For a more extended review of the different types of 
pricing problems (e.g. first- or second-best pricing, dynamic road pricing, bottle-
neck models etc.) the reader can refer to Yang and Huang (2005).  
The traditional network supply curve (desired or input demand vs. average tra-
vel cost) is not consistent with the physics of traffic. This is because for a given 
average flow (i.e. desired demand over a period of time) the total cost (expressed 
in delay terms) (i) is sensitive, during congested conditions, to small variations of 
flow within the given period and (ii) depends on the initial state of the system (the 
level of congestion). It has been broadly shown through simulation and field expe-
riments (for example Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008) plots between pertinent va-
riables (flow, speed, delay) on a spatially disaggregated level, i.e. in one link in a 
network, are very chaotic and do not follow a well-defined curve. (The main rea-
son is that, at a link level, traffic systems are not in steady-state conditions.) Thus, 
the estimated congestion toll based on idealized versions of these curves may not 
be optimal and the system may be either still congested (if under-priced) or very 
uncongested (if over-priced).  
Instead, in this paper we propose a cordon-based congestion pricing scheme 
which (i) is easier to implement in real cities because it should have lower collec-
tion and transaction costs than link-based or area-based tolling (Levinson 2002; 
Levinson and Odlyzko 2008); (ii) is based on traffic models that are readily ob-
servable with existing monitoring technologies, they can be verified and their pre-
dictions trusted; and (iii) can account for dynamic characteristics of traffic. We 
propose a dynamic model of congestion pricing (such as for the morning com-
mute) of congested networks consistent with the physics of traffic. This paper 
combines Vickrey’s theory with a macroscopic traffic model, which has been re-
cently proposed and tested (Daganzo 2007; Geroliminis and Daganzo 2007, 2008). 
According to this, traffic in large urban regions (neighborhoods) can be modeled 
dynamically at an aggregate level, if the neighborhoods are uniformly congested. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
most important features of the macroscopic fundamental diagram (MFD) and 
shows the ambiguity of the marginal-cost models to deal with dynamic conditions. 
Section 3 introduces the equilibrium conditions for a network governed by an 
MFD and gives some results from a real experiment. Section 4 estimates the op-
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timal time-varying fine toll for this network and provides insights for the trade-off 
between equity and reliability, while Section 5 provides discussion and some fu-
ture work. 
2. A Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD) for Urban 
Traffic 
It has been recently proposed and tested in Daganzo (2007) and Geroliminis and 
Daganzo (2007, 2008) that traffic in large urban regions can be modeled dynami-
cally at an aggregate level, if the neighborhoods are uniformly congested. These 
papers showed, using a micro-simulation of the San Francisco Business district 
and a field experiment in downtown Yokohama (Japan), (i) that urban neighbor-
hoods approximately exhibit a “Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram” (MFD) relat-
ing the number of vehicles (accumulation) in the neighborhood to the neighbor-
hood’s average speed (or flow) and (ii) there is a robust linear relation between the 
neighborhood’s average flow and its total outflow (rate vehicles reach their desti-
nations). The experiment used a combination of fixed detectors and floating ve-
hicle probes as sensors. Fig. 1 shows some findings of the experiment in Yokoha-
ma (time resolution is 5min). It was observed that when the somewhat chaotic 
scatter-plots of speed vs. density from individual fixed detectors were aggregated 
for a 10km2 region, the scatter nearly disappeared and points grouped neatly along 
a smoothly declining curve (compare Fig. 1a with 1b-1d). The same references al-
so showed that (a) the MFD is a property of the network itself (infrastructure and 
control) and not of the demand, i.e. the MFD should have a well-defined maxi-
mum and remain invariant when the demand changes both with the time-of-day 
and across days (it may vary if the O-D pattern of demand changes significantly, 
though, e.g. due to an event or evacuation); (b) the space-mean flow, is maximum 
for the same value of density of vehicles or average speed, independent of the ori-
gin-destination tables; (c) the average trip length for the study region is about con-
stant with time, i.e. the total outflow vs. density curve is a scaled up version of the 
curve in Fig. 1b; and (d) the MFD can be estimated accurately using existing mon-
itoring technologies (e.g. detector data, GPS etc). In this paper, we utilize the 
properties of an MFD to develop a cordon-based congestion pricing scheme that 
overcomes some limitations of the existing models. 
The Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD) resembles the classical Micro-
scopic Fundamental Diagram (µFD). It has been observed from empirically de-
rived µFD that the same flow can be achieved on many links at two different 
speeds. This has been dubbed the “backward-bending” phenomenon (Hau 1998; 
Crozet and Marlot 2001) or “hypercongestion”. There are at least two sources for 
“backward-bending” speed-flow relationships. The first has to do with the point of 
observation. Observing the lane flow upstream of a bottleneck gives the impres-
sion of a backward bending relationship, but this disappears at the bottleneck it-
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self. Under any given demand pattern, flow and speed are a unique pair. When 
demand is below the downstream active bottleneck’s capacity, a flow on an up-
stream link can be achieved at high speed. When demand is above the downstream 
active bottleneck’s capacity, the same flow on the upstream link can only be 
achieved at a low speed because of queueing. The second has to do with a capacity 
drop at the bottleneck itself under congested conditions. However, much research 
reports that this drop is slight to non-existent (Cassidy and Bertini 1999; Zhang 
and Levinson 2004). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Loop detector data (taken from Geroliminis and Daganzo 2008): (a) flow vs. occupancy 
pairs for two single detectors across a day; (b) average flow vs. average density (per 5 min) from 
all the detectors across two different days; (c) a map of Yokohama and the study site; (d) average 
speed vs. average occupancy (Each of the 8 different stamps represents a different time period 
for two days – onset and decay of AM and PM peak for a weekend and a weekday) 
If traffic behaves as a queue through a bottleneck, traffic flow departing the 
queue may not stay at its maximum if (a) vehicles in the queue could not travel 
fast enough so that the front of the following car could not reach the point of the 
front of the leading car in the time allotted the service rate (This is very slow traf-
fic, and may properly be called hypercongestion, but in general traffic departing 
the front of the queue will be faster, as the shockwave that reduces speed (the 
wave of red brake lights) has moved to the back of the queue); (b) if the departure 
flow is affected by external sources; or (c) the bottleneck is not being fully served.  
Examining traffic upstream of the bottleneck is interesting, but does not get to 
the root of the problem – the bottleneck itself. This view of hypercongestion is 
thus not inconsistent with the conclusion drawn by Small and Chu (2003) that the 
hypercongested region is unsuitable for use as a supply curve in congestion pric-
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ing analyses. We further suggest that the use of “supply curves” is often inappro-
priate, given the non-stationary nature of congestion. 
We now show that the traditional average cost vs. demand curve (introduced by 
Pigou and applied in most of the marginal-cost models) does not provide an accu-
rate representation of congestion when traffic conditions are not stationary. Con-
sider a region of a city, e.g. the part of Downtown Yokohama shown in Fig. 1c, 
which traffic state is described by properties (i) and (ii) of the first paragraph of 
this section. Then the state of the system is governed by the mass conservation eq-
uation (Daganzo 2007) 
 ( ) ( ( ))dn I t o n t
dt
′= − , (1) 
where n is the accumulation (number of the vehicles in the system), ( )I t′  is the 
input rate (inflow) to the system at time t, and o is the total outflow from the sys-
tem as a function of accumulation. This equation simply explains that traffic sys-
tems are dynamic and to estimate the state of the system at time t (and then the av-
erage travel time through curve in Fig. 1d), the knowledge of the input flow is not 
sufficient, but boundary conditions are needed, i.e. the state of the system at a 
prior time t′ . Thus, a traffic model that estimates the average travel time based on 
a specific demand-cost curve ignores not only variations in the demand, but more 
importantly that this travel time will be different if the initial state of the system is 
uncongested, near maximum flow conditions or in the congested regime.  
To further explore this issue we analyze here some additional data from the 
Yokohama experiment and we present the results. For a whole day we calculated 
per 5 min the total input flow entering downtown (vehicles crossing the dashed 
line in Fig. 1c), the average network flow inside the region (vehicle miles traveled 
per unit time over total network length) and the average speed and we plotted the 
results for different times of a day, shown in Fig. 2. Pairs of total flow vs. pace 
(1/speed) rely in a well-defined curve (Fig. 2b), which is not affected by the dif-
ferent origin-destination pairs and demand variations across a day, i.e. it can de-
scribe a dynamic traffic system. Nevertheless, the input flow vs. pace curve not 
only has significantly more scatter, but also successive points follow different 
paths during the onset and offset of congestion in the morning and evening peak. 
Thus, in this paper we will proceed using the tool of the MFD to describe conges-
tion dynamically and derive efficient pricing policies.    
It is clear that the result of an efficient control policy (congestion pricing in our 
case) should not allow the system to reach states on the decreasing branch of the 
MFD (Fig. 1b). In which state of the MFD a city should be operate is a policy de-
cision. For example, state R in Fig. 1b is a more reliable and less equitable state, 
because the average speed is higher, but the system operates at a space-mean flow 
below the maximum. Thus, fewer people (presumably those with a higher value of 
time) pay the pricing charge and travel in the rush hour. State E is more equitable 
(higher flow) and has a slower speed, but the total welfare may be smaller depend-
ing on the distribution of the value of time and costs of schedule delay within the 
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population. The model developed below provides the necessary tools to analyze 
the trade-off between reliability and equity. 
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Fig. 2. Loop detector data from Yokohama: a) input flow vs. average pace (1/speed) pairs across 
a day; b) Average network flow vs. average pace pairs for the same day (Data resolution is 
15min) 
3. The Recurring Congestion Problem for a Network (No-toll 
Case) - Model Formulation and Equilibrium Solution 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the recurring congestion problem (such 
as for the morning commute) at a network level for an urban area. The main dif-
ference between our problem and the one for a single bottleneck is that capacity 
(maximum flow in our case) is a function of average density during congested 
conditions. For a single bottleneck, queues form when demand is higher than ca-
pacity and the system operates at capacity until queues clear. At the network level, 
as more vehicles enter the system (accumulation on the right hand side of point E 
in Fig. 1b) the average network flow and the total outflow of the system decrease 
and, as a result, the effect of congestion is more significant. The consequence of 
this property for urban networks is that the estimation of equilibrium and the op-
timum toll are not straightforward and the analytical model should be refined. As 
we will show, many regularities of the single bottleneck model also apply in net-
works. 
The formulation of the problem is as follows: It is assumed that a group of 
travelers wish travel through a network and reach their destination (e.g. work) on 
time. If ( )Z t  denotes the cumulative number of travelers that wish to reach their 
destination by time t, then the demand rate, ( ) ( ) /Z t dZ t dt′ ≡ , exceeds the maxi-
mum network outflow, γ, only during some time interval 1 2[ , ]t t  and ( )Z t  is an S-
shaped function (first derivative is always positive and second derivative is zero 
only once). Nevertheless, demand decreases below γ after 2t  and eventually eve-
rybody reaches his destination. Commuters are assumed to be aware of traffic 
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conditions day-after-day and they choose their departure time to minimize their 
individual total trip cost. This cost has two components, (i) the delay, w, because 
conditions are not free-flow and demand is high and (ii) a schedule penalty be-
cause commuters arrive at their destination early or late. The schedule penalty 
function, ( )sc ⋅  as in most of such studies is assumed to be piecewise linear, where 
*t  is the desired arrival time, and e and l are positive earliness and lateness rates, 
 ( ) ( )( )
* *
*
* *
, ,
, .s
l t t if t t
c t t
e t t if t t
⎧− − ≤⎪− = ⎨ − >⎪⎩
 (2) 
The queue discipline is first-in-first-out (FIFO). The problem is, given ( )Z t , to 
determine a curve ( )I t , the cumulative number of departures from home at time t 
(inflow into the congested region), and a corresponding stable choice of arrivals at 
the final destination, ( )A t , such that no traveler has an incentive to deviate from 
his choice and find a departure time giving less total trip cost than the one expe-
riences. Under a FIFO queueing discipline the travel delay for a given vehicle ar-
riving at its destination at time t, ( )w t , is the horizontal distance between curves I 
and A, while his scheduled delay, ( )s t  is the horizontal distance between curves A 
and Z. We assume that the average travel time, τ, and the total outflow, o, are a 
function of the system accumulation n, i.e. the network is described by an MFD 
and average trip length, L, is constant over time (Average network speed is by de-
finition vehicle-miles traveled per unit time over average accumulation, while ve-
hicle-miles is estimated during steady-state conditions as the product of outflow 
and trip length): 
 ( )
( )
nn
o n L
=τ . (3) 
Travel delay is defined as the additional travel time to the travel time for a 
maximum flow, γ, 
 0( ) ( ) (min( , ))w n n n n= −τ τ , (4) 
where 0n  is the accumulation of the system when maximum outflow, γ, occurs. 
The assumption here is that commuters when conditions are not congested 
0( )n n<  will arrive at their destination on time, which means that they have no 
incentive to experience schedule delay to improve their total trip cost. By observ-
ing real data from Yokohama, it turns out that this is a logical assumption for real 
cities because speed changes with time outside the rush hour are smooth enough to 
make the decision of travelling at higher speed and experience an earliness penal-
ty, not worthwhile (the small time saved traveling by arriving early is outweighed 
by the early arrival penalty). The consequence of this assumption is that curves A, 
I and Z coincide when 0n n< ; thus, the problem can be expressed in an elegant 
form as shown in Fig. 3. (There is an analogy with the assumption of zero travel 
time until travelers reach the bottleneck for the Vickrey’s model. It is also useful 
  
Cordon Pricing Consistent with the Physics of Overcrowding   227 
when commuters, who leave in the suburbs travel a free-flow distance before 
reaching the congested network, and this time is omitted from our model.) 
For a given function ( )Z t  of the shape of Fig. 3 there should be some (un-
known for now) time 0t  when system reaches the state of maximum flow for the 
first time. Any traveler prior to time 0t  can reach his destination with zero travel 
and schedule delay. Again if the congestion vanishes after 3t  the traveler will also 
choose to have zero cost. This means that ( ) ( ) ( )A t Z t I t= =  for 0t t≤  and 3t t≥ . 
In contrast with the single bottleneck model, given 0t , the estimation of 1t  is not 
trivial as /dA dt ≤ γ for 0 3t t t< < . The problem is to determine 0t , 3t  and ( )n t  
or ( )A t , as by knowing the one we estimate the other through equation (1). 
 
 
Fig.3. Cumulative number of travelers who enter the network, I(t), arrive at their destination, 
A(t), or have work starting times, Z(t), less than t. 0 3 1 2( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))A t A t Z t Z t′ ′ ′ ′= = = =γ  
If wc  is the shadow cost of travel delay, the trip cost for a traveler that reaches 
his destination at time t, but has a desired time *t  is 
 * *( , ) ( ( )) ( )w sc t t w n t c c t t= + − . (5) 
Given that (i) 0 0 3 3( , ) ( , ) 0c t t c t t= =  and (ii) *( , ) 0c t t >  for all * 0 3, ( , )t t t t∈ , a 
necessary condition for a minimum *( , )c t t  for a specific traveler is  
 
*( , ) ( ( )) ( ) 0w s
c t t w n t n t c c
t
∂ ′ ′= ⋅ − =∂ . (6) 
time    t0               t       t1       tμ     t2                 t3   
I(t) 
A(t) 
Z(t) 
w(t)       s(t) 
   γ 
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The traveler that experiences the maximum travel delay arrives on time, at time 
tμ . Otherwise, he could start his trip slightly earlier (later) if he was late (early) 
and decrease both his schedule and travel delay, i.e. his total trip cost. (The single 
bottleneck model reaches the same conclusion and queueing delay also has a tri-
angular shape.) The ordinary differential equation in equation (6) does not contain 
the desired arrival time *t  and it can be solved simultaneously for all travelers, as 
they all see the same travel delay function ( ( ))w n t . Thus, the travel delay will 
have a triangular shape with time, increasing from 0t  to tμ  with a slope / we c  
and then decreasing from tμ  to 3t  with slope / wl c− , as shown in Fig. 4: 
 
( )
( )
0
3
, ,
( ( ))
, .
w
w
e t t if t t
cw n t l t t if t t
c
μ
μ
⎧ − ≤⎪⎪= ⎨⎪− − >⎪⎩
 (7) 
  
 
 
Fig.4. Delay for travelers arriving at their destination at time t. 
Now, it is straightforward to estimate ( )n t  and then ( )A t  through equation (8). 
Empirical observations show that ( )w n  is an one-to-one function (monotonically 
decreasing for 0n n> ), so it is invertible. 
 
( )
( )
1
0
1
3
, ,
( )
, .
w
w
ew t t if t t
cn t
lw t t if t t
c
− μ
− μ
⎧ ⎛ ⎞− ≤⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠= ⎨ ⎛ ⎞⎪ − − >⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
 (8) 
Also, it is easy to show that ( )A t  and ( )Z t  intersect exactly once in the inter-
val 0 3( , )t t , at time tμ . The slope of ( )A t  depends on the value of ( )n t , which 
has a similar shape with ( ( ))w n t , increasing in 0[ , )t tμ  and then decreasing in 
t0                      tμ              t3         time
e/cw                                        l/cw 
 (n(t)) 
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3( , ]t tμ . Thus, ( )A t  is also an S-shaped function (where the first derivative is al-
ways positive and second derivative is zero only once) and cannot intersect with 
( )Z t  more than once given that ( ) ( )A t Z t=  for 0 3,t t t= . 
To have a complete solution we need to determine 0t , tμ  and 3t . We will 
present here a constructive solution as an analytical solution for a general ( )Z t  
function looks very tedious.  The implementation consists of the following steps: 
1. Choose a 0 1t t< . Estimate ( )n t  using equation (8) and then ( ( ))o n t  through 
equations (3) and (4).  
2. Construct 
0
( ) ( ( )A t o n d= ∫ττ τ τ  and find tμ , 3t  as the intersection points of 
( )A t  and ( )Z t . Estimate 3 0( ) /( ) /t t t t e l= − − −μ μρ . 
3. If 0=ρ , this is the right solution. Otherwise repeat steps 1 and 2 by choosing 
a smaller 0t  if  0>ρ  or a larger 0t  if  0<ρ . 
We should note that Small and Chu (2003) solved a similar formulation of the 
no-toll network equilibrium under many simplified assumptions: (i) all travelers 
have the same desired arrival time *t , (ii) demand is constant in time interval 
1 2[ , ]t t  and (iii) speed is a linear function of network accumulation. They did not 
obtain the regularities obtained in our paper. 
4. Cordon-based Optimal Pricing for a Network  
4.1 An Optimal Fine Toll to Reduce Congestion 
We provide here an analytical derivation of the social optimum using a time-
dependent (“fine”) toll. As travel delay is a deadweight loss, we are looking for 
this toll that will minimize total travel time, i.e. travel delay, as defined in equation 
(4), will be zero for all travelers. Thus, ( ) ( )A t I t=  t∀  and we are interested only 
in curves A and Z. Vickrey (1969) pointed out that if we charge a time-dependent 
toll equal to the time spent in queue (travel delay in our case) travelers would ar-
rive at the bottleneck (enter the network) at such times that queues (travel delay) 
would not form. The effect of this is that “one could convert the worthless expense 
of queueing into money” (Newell 1987). Also, Arnott et al. (1990) described that 
the length of the rush hour will be the same in the toll case and the social opti-
mum. But, this does not hold for the network model. 
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The important difference between a single bottleneck with constant capacity 
and a network is that 0 0
tollt t≠ , 3 3tollt t≠ , tollt t≠μ μ  because of time-varying 
throughput (During congestion an active bottleneck operates at capacity if there is 
no restriction downstream, but a network is described by an MFD, which means 
that the rate users reach their destination decreases for high congestion levels). 
The advantage of applying the toll is not only that delays disappear but also the 
length of the rush hour becomes shorter. Also, the average optimal fine toll is 
smaller than the average delay cost (Arnott et al. (1993) shows that these two 
quantities are the same for the single bottleneck). This means that the savings in 
travelers’ delay are significantly higher for the network model. Mathematically 
speaking, we show here how the values for the optimal toll ( )T t  and the begin-
ning and ending times 0
tollt , 3
tollt  are derived. 
First, we are looking for the smallest possible time-dependent toll that will keep 
travel delays, as per equation (4), at zero. Obviously, after the enforcement of this 
toll, system should operate at maximum outflow, γ. Otherwise, with a slightly 
smaller toll, we could allow more people to enter the system with zero delay pe-
nalty, as per equation (4). (In the next section we analyze the potential travel time 
savings by applying a stricter toll.) Fig. 5 describes our problem with curves for 
cumulative actual arrivals, ( )tollA t , and desired arrivals, ( )Z t . 
 
 
Fig. 5. Cumulative number of travelers who arrive at their destination, A(t), or have work starting 
times, Z(t), less than t for the optimum fine toll (zero delay). 
time    t0           t0toll              tμtoll          t3toll      t3    
Atoll(t)
Z(t) 
   γ
I(t) 
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Second, 0 1
tollt t<  and 2 3tollt t< , i.e. to eliminate travel delay the time window 
for which desired arrival rates are higher than outflow γ should be a subset of the 
time window for which the toll is applied. The total cost for a traveler with desired 
arrival *t , who arrives at destination at time t is 
 * *( , ) ( ) ( )toll sc t t T t c t t= + − . (9) 
Travelers with desired arrivals at 0 3(or )
toll tollt t  experience zero earliness (or 
lateness) penalty. Otherwise, they would have the incentive to begin their trip 
slightly earlier (or later) and decrease their total trip cost. For the same reason 
0 3( ) ( ) 0
toll tollT t T t= = . If ( )T t  is a continuous and differentiable function in the in-
terval 0 3[ , ]
toll tollt t , then a necessary condition for a specific traveler to minimize 
his total trip cost is *( , ) / 0tollc t t t∂ ∂ = . Solving for ( )T t  we get: 
 
( )
( )
0 0
3 3
, ,
( ) , ,
0, all other times.
toll toll toll
w
toll toll toll
w
e t t if t t t
c
lT t t t if t t t
c
μ
μ
⎧ − ≤ ≤⎪⎪⎪= − − ≤ ≤⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 (10) 
Estimation of 0
tollt , tolltμ  and 3tollt  is less tedious now. We can apply the same 
procedure with the no-toll case described in the end of Section 3.1. The only dif-
ference is that 0( ) ( )
tollA t Z t t= + γ .  
While savings for travelers in the single bottleneck level was 0 (toll=waiting 
time), savings for travelers who pay toll are positive and consist of (i) savings in 
travel delay, which are higher than the toll paid and (ii) savings in the schedule de-
lay. If ( )δ γ  is the duration of the toll period for outflow γ, and (no toll)δ  the 
length of the rush hour in the no-toll case, total savings for all travelers (including 
the cost of tolls) are  
 ( )2 21$ (no toll) ( )2 lel eΔ = − +γδ δ γ . (11) 
Total savings are equal to the total travel delay in the no-toll case (Area of tri-
angle in Fig. 4) minus the total cost of toll during period ( )δ γ . Equation (11) 
omits savings in schedule delay because the estimation is tedious. In any case,  
$Δ  are direct savings that can be estimated even if ( )Z t  is unknown (which is 
consistent with reality wherein transportation agencies can measure travel delay 
but not schedule delay). Section 4.3 will present an example using some real data 
from Yokohama. 
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4.2 Policy Implications: Equity vs. Reliability 
In the previous sections we omitted the fact that traffic states with outflow less 
than γ, will experience higher average speeds and therefore lower travel times. Al-
though this assumption does not change the equilibrium in the no-toll case, it ig-
nores potential savings in travel delay if a higher toll than the one estimated in 
Section 4.1 is applied. A higher toll will push the system to operate at an outflow 
′ <γ γ  during the toll period. This also implies that we should use a smaller value 
for 0n  in equation (4). For example, state R in Fig. 1b is a more reliable and less 
equitable state, because the average speed is higher (and more likely to be stable), 
but the system operates at a space-mean flow below the maximum. Thus, fewer 
people (presumably those with a higher value of time) pay the toll and travel in the 
rush hour. State E is more equitable (with a higher flow) but has a slower speed, 
so the total welfare may be smaller depending on the distribution of the value of 
time within the population. Also, state R is more reliable than state E, because as 
( )Z t  and schedule penalty rates are unobservable quantities, a toll may not be ef-
ficient at all times, and certain tolls allow the system to reach congested states, 
where 0n n> . In which state of the MFD a city should operate is a policy deci-
sion. We estimate now what is the change in the total cost because of a stricter 
toll. 
Fig. 6 plots the cumulative arrivals for different capacities with ′ <γ γ . But, 
travel time for outflow ′γ  and γ are different and this has been omitted from the 
graph, as for cumulative actual arrivals, ( )tollA t
′γ , we have chosen a smaller value 
for 0n  in equation (4). In the extreme case we choose outflow 
3 0 3 0( ( ) ( )) /( )Z t Z t t t′′ = − −γ , this implies that (i) the toll period is equal to the 
rush hour period for the no toll case and (ii) time dependent toll equals to the cost 
equivalent of the travel delay ( $ 0)Δ = , i.e. the same conclusions with the single 
bottleneck model. In the latter case, the benefit for the traveler is almost zero (only 
a small reduction in schedule delay) while the benefit for the city (toll operator) is 
higher. That is, tolls can be set higher to be profit maximizing or lower to be wel-
fare maximizing. Traditionally welfare calculations have been dominated by travel 
time and tolls; however, welfare maximization is itself ambiguous, and tolls may 
be higher or lower depending on how welfare is calculated, e.g. does it account for 
schedule delay, reliability, inter-personal equity, etc. Our case does not allow for 
demand elasticity, which poses a natural future extension, so a profit maximizing 
toll here would be infinite.  
If γ΄ is close to γ function Z(t) is smooth in the beginning and the end of tolling 
period, we can assume that tolltμ  is approximately the same in the two cases (this 
assumption makes the calculations less tedious; the exact solution is not presented 
here). The change in the total cost ( , )C ′Δ γ γ  is the sum of positive changes in to-
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tal schedule delay ( , )S ′Δ γ γ  and negative changes in total travel time ( , )T ′Δ γ γ . 
Schedule delay changes occur because the length of tolling period increases and as 
the toll is higher, the length of the earliness and lateness period increase as well. 
Travel time changes occur because people are travelling faster during the tolling 
period [ ( ) ( ) / ]′ ′≅δ γ δ γ γ γ .After some manipulations and first order approxima-
tions we have that:  
 ( )2 23 01 1 1( , ) 02 toll toll leS t t l e⎛ ⎞′Δ ≅ − − >⎜ ⎟′ +⎝ ⎠γ γ γ γ γ , (12a) 
 ( ) ( )2 1 13 0( , ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0toll toll wT t t o o c− −′ ′Δ ≅ − − <γ γ γ τ γ τ γ . (12b) 
 
 
Fig.6. Cumulative number of travelers who arrive at their destination, or have desired arrival less 
than t for different values of capacities ( )′ <γ γ  with a fine toll (zero delay). 
Thus, it depends on the values of the related parameters if such a decision is 
beneficial for the average traveler. By combining equations (12a) and (12b) a 
higher toll maybe beneficial for the population if ratio ω is smaller than 1, e.g. 
when function ( )nτ  is sharp on the left hand side of 0n , or schedule penalty rates 
are low. 
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5. An Example based on Field Observations 
We apply now the models developed in Sections 3 and 4 to a test site (Downtown 
Yokohama, Japan). The part of downtown Yokohama examined in this paper is 
approximately a 10 km2 triangle, which includes streets of various types, with 
closely spaced signalized intersections (~100-300m), and a few elevated freeways. 
Yokohama’s center is congested during peak hours with average speeds less than 
10 kilometers per hour observed for extended periods during morning and evening 
peak in weekdays in the arterial network. A previous study has analyzed a combi-
nation of fixed (detectors) and mobile (GPS in vehicles) sensors data and esti-
mated relations between average traffic variables during different days in resolu-
tion of 5 min (like the ones presented in Figs. 1 and 2, i.e. accumulation, average 
travel time, outflows, input flows etc). It also provided a method to estimate the 
accumulation of the network with time. This study verified that (i) an MFD (relat-
ing average flow and density) can describe aggregate traffic in this site and (ii) the 
ratio of network flow over outflow (which is linearly related to the average trip 
length-see equation (3)) is an invariant during a day and across days, i.e. the traffic 
model used to describe travel behavior and derive equilibrium conditions for the 
recurring congestion problem of Sections 3 and 4 provides a realistic representa-
tion of macroscopic traffic conditions in the area. For a detailed description of the 
experiment the reader can refer to Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008). 
Fig. 7 shows the estimation of accumulation during the morning peak for the 
study site using real data for one weekday. The point of the MFD with maximum 
outflow is the pair 0( , ) (7600 ,785 / 5min)n vh vh=γ . We also fitted a curve in tra-
vel time vs. accumulation data for 0n n>  and a linear function provided an ade-
quate fitting. Trip duration (in minutes) is 3( ) 2.52 10 8.08n n−= × −τ  2( 0.79)R = .  
An interesting observation is that we can test some of the theoretical results of 
Section 3, without requiring knowledge of the ( )Z t  and values for l and e. Actual-
ly, we show that we can estimate these by looking at this traffic data. Fig. 7 shows 
that we can approximate quite well the onset and offset of congestion as a piece-
wise linear function of accumulation with time. (We do not consider accumulation 
in the tails of the peak period as traveler behavior may be different). As ( )nτ  is 
linear and ( )n t  has a triangular form, ( )w t  will have the same (triangular shape) 
with ( )n t . Furthermore, the ratio of slopes for the onset and the offset of conges-
tion will be the same for travel delays and accumulation. Thus, we observe with 
real data that (i) travel delay, as per equations (4) and (7), is a realistic approxima-
tion of our study site and (ii) we can estimate the ratio of earliness over lateness 
rates 3139 / 6123 0.51e l ≅ = , which value is in accordance with an earlier study 
(Small 1982). 
We now derive a cordon-based congestion pricing for downtown Yokohama 
based on the theoretical results of Section 4. Note from Fig. 7 that we can extract 
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the values for 0t , 3t  and tμ ; the beginning, the end of the peak hour and the time 
when delay is maximum. Thus, we can reproduce ( )A t  and ( )I t  curves described 
in Fig. 3. This is shown in Fig. 8 and the area between A and I curves is the total 
travel delay, as per equation (4), during the morning peak period.  
Given the value of γ, we could construct an optimal fine toll solution, if we 
knew ( )Z t . Neverheless, ( )Z t  is not easily observable. To simplify matters we 
assume that all the desired arrivals are uniformly distributed in an interval D, sub-
set of the interval 0 3[ , ]t t , i.e. ( )Z t  is flat outside D and has a constant slope, s, in 
D. Under this condition, one can easily show that tollt tμ μ= . Thus, if we know the 
shadow price of travel delay wc , we can evaluate the optimal fine toll, as per equ-
ation (10), because e/l is already known from Fig. 7. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Number of vehicles in downtown Yokohama during the day of Dec. 14, 2001. 
We now treat equity and reliability issues, by evaluating the optimal fine toll for 
different values of maximum flow, i.e. in what mobility level the study city should 
choose to operate. For this analysis we assume that 1000 /s vh hr= , 25% higher 
than γ. Besides γ, we estimate the optimal fine toll for  
3 0 3 0( ( ) ( )) /( )Z t Z t t t′′ = − −γ  and a value γ γ γ′ ′′< < . Fig. 8 also shows the actual 
arrivals in destination ( )tollA t
γ , ( )tollA tγ
′  after the implementation of tolls according 
to the model.  Table 1 summarizes the results for the no-toll case and the optimal 
fine toll for  γ , γ ′  and γ ′′  in terms of schedule delays, travel delays and tolls 
paid and duration of the toll period (length of peak period in the no-toll case). 
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Fig. 8. Application of cordon based pricing in the downtown Yokohama for maximum outflow γ 
(equity) and a smaller value γ ′  (reliability). Equilibrium solutions with and without tolls 
( 1000 / , $20 / )ws vh hr c hr= = .  
Table 1. Comparison of schedule, travel delays and tolls for different cordon-based fine tolls ap-
plied in Yokohama.  
 No-toll Toll for γ Toll for γ′ Toll for γ″ 
Toll duration (hr) 2:21 2:00 2:09 2:21 
Start time 8:27 8:41 8:35 8:27 
End time 10:48 10:41 10:44 10:48 
Total Travel Delay(vh-hr) 1792 0 -283 -581 
Av. Travel Delay(min/vh) 5.94 0 -0.9 -1.85 
Total earliness (vh-hr) 3502 1713 2309 3105 
Total lateness(vh-hr) 985 496 669 900 
Aver. earliness (min/vh) 17.2 8.4 11.3 15.2 
Aver. Lateness (vh/min) 9.0 4.5 6.1 8.2 
Aver. Toll ($)  0 1.69 1.81 1.98 
Aver. Toll (travel min) 0 5.06 5.43 5.94 
Max. outflow (vh/5min)  784.9 730.1 668.0 
 
In the case of cordon pricing for the maximum possible outflow, the travel de-
lays are eliminated, while schedule delays are about half of the no-toll case 
(8.4min and 4.5min average earliness and lateness vs. 17.2min and 9min respec-
tively). The average travel delay savings are about 6min/vh which is 75% of the 
average travel time at outflow γ. (Note that these travel times are relatively small 
because the study area is about 10 km2 and we consider only the travel inside the 
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region, i.e. the average trip length L, as per equation (3), is the average distance 
traveled inside the region per trip completion.)   
By charging a slightly higher toll ($1.81 instead of $1.69) each traveler saves 
about 1min of travel delay but schedule delays increase more (2.9min the earliness 
and 1.6min the lateness). Thus, it depends on the relative ratio of / we c  which pol-
icy is better. For the extreme case of γ ′′ , schedule delays increase at a higher rate.  
The parameters that affect the described pricing scheme are the e/l ratio, the 
shape of the MFD, the value of time wc  and the ( )Z t  function. As wc  and ( )Z t   
are not easily observable quantities, a city can identify the optimum toll by a trial-
and-error procedure where the toll is modified based on the state of the city in the 
MFD (higher toll when 0n n> ). 
6. Discussion and Future Work 
In this paper, we argued and verified with results from a real experiment that the 
standard economic models of marginal cost cannot describe traffic congestion in 
networks during time-dependent conditions. Then, we extended Vickrey’s model 
of peak-hour for a single bottleneck, in the case of a network and we estimated a 
cordon-based fine toll to reduce congestion. The main difference between these 
two models is that for a single bottleneck, queues form when demand is higher 
than capacity and the system operates at capacity until queues clear. On the con-
trary, at the network level, maximum outflow is a function of average density dur-
ing congested conditions and as more vehicles enter a congested system the aver-
age network flow and the total outflow decrease. We also examined some policy 
implications of the cordon-based pricing to treat equity and reliability issues, i.e. 
in what mobility level a city should choose to operate. We also applied the model 
to develop a pricing scheme for downtown Yokohama, without requiring accurate 
prediction of unobservable quantities. 
One interesting result was that by applying an optimal toll not only delays dis-
appear, but also the length of the rush hour shortens. Also, the savings in travel 
and schedule delay are much higher than the total amount of toll paid and this is 
true for every user. This scheme is Pareto-efficient as everybody is better-off by 
this policy and nobody can improve his situation by entering the system at a dif-
ferent time. Another interesting result is that total schedule delay costs are of the 
same order of magnitude as travel delay costs. Thus, models that ignore this sig-
nificant cost for a traveler may yield to erroneous conclusions. While this model 
provides a simplified description about travelers’ choices, the effect of congestion 
in their decisions and cordon-based pricing schemes to improve cities mobility, 
some extensions are needed. 
First, the model developed in this paper is macroscopic for both travelers (de-
mand) and the network (supply), each was based on statistical distributions. One 
could apply the same ideas in a microscopic behavioral micro-simulation (agent-
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based) framework with individual travelers collectively creating congestion which 
takes the form of the MFD. Individual travelers will vary in the desired arrival 
time, early and lateness penalty, willingness to tolerate variability or unreliability 
in travel times, demand elasticity (willingness to not travel by car), and tolerance 
for delay. Use of the MFD may enable sketch-planning of cordon or area-based 
congestion pricing programs without specific network routing and network simu-
lation results. Coupling the MFD with agent-based models would allow the ex-
amination of equity and efficiency effects of alternative pricing policies.  
More empirical examples to justify the appropriateness of the MFD are in 
progress. We try to understand what types of networks and under what conditions 
experience an MFD with small scatter. Also, a fine toll is not always easy to im-
plement. We are interested in finding the equilibrium in the case of coarse tolls for 
the network model. Arnott et al. (1993) solved this problem for a single bottle-
neck. The solution is not straightforward because ( )A t  will not be S-shaped, as 
travel delays are not eliminated.  
As well, it is desirable to apply these concepts in the case of elastic demand, 
where people not only change the starting time of their trip, but also can decide 
not to travel if e.g. the toll is too high or the system is extremely congested. Also, 
a successful implementation of the proposed pricing scheme will shorten the 
length of the congested peak period. This may induce more people to drive by car 
and decrease the modal shift. A model that can describe the dynamic nature of this 
issue or policy decisions that will address the induced demand can have some re-
search priority. 
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